The measures of success
Europe’s Emissions Trading Scheme is
attracting admiration, hostility, lawsuits
and intense scrutiny. But is it actually
going to work? Mark Nicholls asks
how we should judge the scheme’s
success
Less than six months after the launch of the EU’s pioneering Emissions
Trading Scheme (ETS) is far too soon to consider the success – or
otherwise – of this pioneering environmental market. Most of the
estimated 5,000 companies covered by the scheme are just beginning
to assess how they expect to comply with the carbon dioxide (CO2)
emissions targets that it sets.
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| Peter Vis, European
Commission:Dont judge the scheme simply by prices
and volumes. |
Nonetheless, the scheme has already ignited a fierce debate in
Europe. On one side are those who fear that limiting CO2
emissions from European companies will place them at a financial
disadvantage to their overseas competitors. On the other, are those
arguing that EU governments have failed to grasp the nettle, by
setting the targets for industry so lax as to make a mockery of
the principles underpinning the scheme.
Further afield, supporters of the Kyoto Protocol are willing the
EU ETS on, hoping that it can demonstrate that emissions trading
can help to meet the climate change agreement’s emissions reduction
targets at low cost. Conversely, its opponents expect to see evidence
that the countries of the EU, despite talking the talk on global
warming, will ultimately balk at the cost of walking the walk.
So, as the scheme begins its first, ‘warm-up’, phase – which began
on 1 January 2005 and runs to the end of 2007 – how do participants
and observers assess its effectiveness?
According to the directive establishing the scheme, the EU ETS
is designed “to contribute to fulfilling the [Kyoto] commitment
of the European Community and its Member States more effectively
… with the least possible diminution of economic development and
employment”.
Such an objective sets, on the face of it, easily quantifiable
metrics by which to judge the scheme’s effectiveness. In terms of
cost, it seems likely that a ‘cap-and-trade’ scheme will deliver
reductions at lower cost than equivalent measures, such as carbon
taxes, says Vicki Arroyo, director of policy analysis at the Pew
Center on Climate Change, a Virginia-based think-tank. “One thing
to look at, retrospectively, is the cost overall to firms in the
EU ETS compared to the costs of achieving similar reductions by
other means.
“What we’ve found, historically, is that trading programmes are
cheaper than ‘command-and-control’ methods, such as imposing technological
or performance standards.”
However, according to many environmental groups, the scheme is
already failing to deliver on its first metric – moving EU members
toward their 2008–12 Kyoto emissions targets. “It is not clear whether
the ETS will actually be a powerful tool to reduce emissions, or
whether member states will continue to dilute it by developing weak
NAPs,” says Oliver Rapf, senior policy officer in WWF’s Brussels
office. “The first allocation round has been a mess. Governments
across all member states have been bowing to industry pressure too
much.”
These NAPs – the ‘national allocation plans’ that governments had
to draw up, setting the 2005–07 emissions targets for all the installations
covered by the scheme – are widely considered to have been generous.
Despite a requirement that they should put member states on a path
towards meeting their various Kyoto targets, many will put little
pressure on corporate emissions. Indeed, investment bank Dresdner
Kleinwort Wasserstein estimates that, compared to a total allocation
of more than 6 billion tonnes of CO2 to industry over
2005–07, the scheme will be ‘short’ barely 40 million–65 million
tonnes each year under ‘business-as-usual’ assumptions.
“You have to keep in mind the objectives of the EU ETS – to contribute
to emission reductions, and in a cost-effective way,” agrees Frede
Capellen, special advisor on environmental policy to Norwegian oil
firm Statoil. “But we shouldn’t expect it to be 100% effective [in
this regard] in the first period. It would be more appropriate to
judge its effectiveness in 2012, than at the end of 2007.”
Indeed, many argue that it would be naďve to expect the scheme
to deliver dramatic early reductions. What is more important, they
say, is that it changes corporate thinking about CO2
emissions and energy use. And evidence from companies affected by
the scheme shows that, regardless of the size of their allowance
allocation, the EU ETS has created a ‘cost of carbon’ that will
now be factored into decision-making.
When BP introduced an internal emissions trading scheme in 1998,
it found that simply imposing a cost of carbon was half the battle,
explains Mark Proegler, head of the emissions markets group at the
oil major. “Recognising that there’s a formal cost of carbon leads
to the commercialisation of carbon,” he says. “It connects the technical
people with the commercial people, and we found lots of low hanging
fruit that was already viable.”
The European Commission endorses this view: “The success of the
scheme lies in establishing incentives to change behaviour,” says
Peter Vis, acting head of the Commission’s industrial emissions
unit. “Don’t judge the scheme simply by prices and volumes, important
though they are. This is about changing mindsets, and should be
seen in a longer perspective than daily variations in price.”
But some within business warn of the danger of the ETS raising
costs for carbon-intensive industries to such an extent that they
are driven outside the EU, to jurisdictions where carbon emissions
are uncapped.
“If you need a carbon price nearer €20-25/tonne to result in significant
fuel switching, then it’s not yet clear that’s the sort of carbon
price that industry can live with,” says Jeremy Nicholson, director
of the UK’s Energy Intensive Users Group.
However, others are confident that the balance of supply and demand
in the global carbon market means that such an eventuality is unlikely
in the short term. “There’s a ‘sweet spot’ that needs to be hit,
where the price is high enough to drive demonstrable progress to
meet global warming goals, but in a way that’s economically efficient,”
says Dirk Forrister, London-based managing director at environmental
brokerage Natsource.
“The signs are that global demand is modest enough for the European
example to work,” he adds. The 2001 withdrawal of the US from the
Kyoto system reduced, at a stroke, a huge need for emissions allowances.
But demand for CO2 allowances from companies in the
EU ETS could be enough to support the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM). “An important aspect of the EU market’s success
is its ability to stimulate action globally,” says Forrister, “and
it is critical to the success of the system that it links up with
other markets around the world.”
The CDM is a cornerstone of the Protocol, promising to generate
sustainable investment in developing countries, in exchange for
emission reduction credits. While the mechanism has been slow to
get off the ground, project developers hope the EU ETS will generate
substantial demand as CDM credits can be used to offset companies’
domestic emissions.
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| Dirk Forrister, Natsource:
“demand is modest enough for the ETS to work” |
“In an operational sense, the two markets are still disconnected,”
cautions Forrister, with price movements in EU Allowances thus far
not reflected in prices of cheaper CDM credits. “That’s a reflection
of the early stage we’re at. It will get better, as spot markets
develop in both products.”
Supporters of the EU ETS are pushing for links to other markets,
apart from the CDM. Norway is in advanced negotiations with the
EU on linking its domestic scheme. And, although neither Canada
nor Japan plan to set up domestic trading schemes before 2008, discussions
are under way about linking them to the EU scheme. There is even
pressure to try to link proposed regional GHG cap-and-trade schemes
in the US – such as one planned by nine northeastern states – to
the EU ETS.
“It would be good for liquidity if the EU ETS could be linked to
other trading markets,” says BP’s Proegler. “The ultimate goal is
a global trading system, and we should look at whether the EU ETS
could provide that platform.”
The EU scheme also has an important role in showing that such a
trading system can be successfully implemented. As the Pew Center’s
Arroyo argues, “the example that the EU is setting is a really important
one”.
“Europe started somewhat fearful of trading, but is now really
leading,” she says. Indeed, it was the US government that insisted
on including trading in the Kyoto Protocol, while the EU was at
best ambivalent about such market mechanisms.
“A success factor for the system is that it forms a platform for
policy development beyond 2012,” when the Protocol’s first reduction
target period ends, says Statoil’s Capellen. “We need a robust system
that delivers cost-effective reductions, that can deliver tougher
environmental targets going forward without losing the support of
the broad constituencies required,” including member state governments
and the business community, as well as environmentalists.
Many in industry agree: whether the scheme leads to dramatic changes
in short-term behaviour is a secondary concern. Of more importance
are solid foundations on which more stringent reduction goals can
be built.
“It’s about reducing emissions, but the amounts are really pretty
small in the global context. It’s a first step,” says Joe Kruger,
a visiting scholar with Resources for the Future, another US think-tank.
“In my view, too much attention is paid to exactly what the price
is, or the number of tonnes included in the NAPs. People should
take the longer view,” he says.
“Is the system working efficiently? Are prices at a level that
maintains political support during the first phase? Are companies
finding the right incentives to make reductions? Are they adapting
to the new regulatory scheme, and starting to plan for the long
term?”
Most would argue that it’s too soon to assess whether companies
are factoring carbon emissions into their long-term planning. “It’s
too early, and it’s been too much of a shock, for the scheme to
be driving longer-term investment decisions already,” says Nick
Campbell, Paris-based chairman of the climate change working group
at Unice, the European employers’ federation. “Most companies are
running around working out how to comply.”
But he argues that – at this point – the success of the scheme
need not be measured in tonnes of carbon abated, but in the much
more prosaic nuts and bolts of carbon management. “The real meat
of the scheme is in getting companies to meet their emissions monitoring,
reporting and verification [MRV] requirements.
“We’re going to have a very accurate idea of what emissions are
in Europe. The EU ETS is going to result in world-class MRV systems
– and that’s going to be seen as a major success,” he says.
However, Leo Birnbaum, a Dusseldorf-based partner at consultancy
McKinsey, warns that the scheme, if not further developed, is in
danger of failing to meet its longer-term goals. “You can’t design
such a system, aimed at long-term behavioural change, on a five-year
basis,” he says. “The system creates more uncertainty about future
developments. And uncertainty is already a major problem, even at
low carbon prices.”
McKinsey is undertaking a study for the Commission, with results
due by the end of the year, to assess how the trading system is
affecting sector competitiveness. This will feed into a review of
the scheme, with the Commission expected to make recommendations
on reforms to the EU ETS in mid-2006.
So the overall sense from industry is that the Commission has some
breathing space before the scheme really needs to deliver. “If,
by 2007,we have an instrument that’s workable, streamlined, with
the various components in place to make the market function, and
with the assumption that it will deliver in environmental terms
in the Kyoto period, then that will be good enough,” says Capallen
at Statoil. EF
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