It is unclear whether the TFFF will complement or compete with existing REDD+ efforts, writes Renat Heuberger
The Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF), set to launch at COP30 in Brazil, is arguably one of the most ambitious forest conservation initiatives proposed in decades.
Its core idea is simple but powerful: raise capital from governments, philanthropies, and private investors, then invest those funds in low-risk, fixed-income or similar assets. The investment returns will finance payments to tropical forest countries based on the number of hectares of eligible forest they maintain or restore.
The scale is significant. An envisaged $25 billion in public and philanthropic funds could leverage up to $100 billion in private investment.
Since COP13 in Bali (2007), the main framework for forest conservation has been REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation). Yet it remains unclear whether the TFFF will complement or compete with existing REDD+ efforts.
In areas where both mechanisms operate, there is a tangible risk of double-counting environmental benefits.
What is clear, however, is that 18 years after its introduction, REDD+ has produced mixed results at best, often mired in controversy.
As discussed in an earlier piece, a key source of these controversies lies in what can be called the Carbon Paradoxes — contradictions that have limited the credibility and effectiveness of carbon credit markets, especially those linked to REDD+.
This raises a central question: Can the TFFF overcome the paradoxes that have constrained the potential of REDD+?
The answer: in some cases, yes; in others, no.
Some of the Carbon Paradoxes and the TFFF's Responses:
1. Polluters Paradox
"The largest polluters should fund carbon credits, yet their participation is often condemned as greenwashing."
Solved by TFFF? Yes.
TFFF funding is decoupled from polluter payments, removing the greenwashing stigma.
2. Ambition Paradox
"More ambitious national climate targets reduce the scope of additional activities that qualify for credits, which can paradoxically disincentivize governments to increase ambition."
Solved by TFFF? Partly.
Funding allocation by TFFF is not necessarily linked or tied to a country's Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC). Nonetheless, the anticipation of external financing could still inadvertently create a disincentive for maintaining or expanding domestically funded forest conservation and restoration initiatives.
3. Price Paradox
"REDD+ credits are less expensive than most other types of credits, prompting suspicion about their quality despite their obvious efficiency in mitigating climate change."
Solved by TFFF? Yes.
Payments are not linked to tons of emissions avoided, so pricing is decoupled from perceived credit value.
4. Baseline Paradox
"Countries that have long protected forests receive no credit, while those that recently deforested can claim rewards for stopping."
Solved by TFFF? Partly.
TFFF can reward ongoing stewardship, not just new restoration. However, restoration may still attract more funding than conservation, as it tends to be more costly and measurable.
5. Communities Paradox
"Strong community participation is essential, but consensus is rarely achievable."
Solved by TFFF? No.
The challenge of ensuring fair representation and avoiding perceptions of exclusion persists, as realities 'on the ground' are often complex and community interests
frequently diverge.
6. Leakage Paradox
"Stopping deforestation in one area can push it elsewhere, offsetting gains."
Solved by TFFF? No.
As long as economic pressures — especially from agricultural expansion — continue, deforestation risks will likely shift geographically.
7. Additionality Paradox
"Only projects that would not happen without climate finance qualify, which excludes commercially viable initiatives."
Solved by TFFF? No.
Like other climate finance mechanisms, the TFFF must focus on projects that rely on external funding rather than those that are commercially viable — an approach that risks fostering financial dependency instead of long-term economic self-sufficiency.
Conclusion
If the TFFF achieves its envisioned scale and operates as intended, it could become a powerful financial instrument for protecting and restoring tropical forests, sidestepping many of the pitfalls that hampered REDD+.
However, it remains a new and untested mechanism. Scaling it will take time, and if significant design flaws emerge late in the process, the result could be delayed action and disillusionment — paradoxically setting back the very forest finance it seeks to accelerate.
Moreover, moving away from "ton-for-ton" carbon accounting, which was the ambition of REDD+, might avoid one of the most complex controversies, namely the alleged over-crediting, but might inadvertently lead to less overall robustness and transparency on the impact achieved.
Renat Heuberger is CEO of Terra Impact Ventures and Author of The Carbon Paradox.